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Throughout the 1950s the Liberal Party of South Africa suffered severe internal 
conflict over basic issues of policy and strategy. On one level this stemmed from 
the internal dynamics of a small party unequally divided between the Cape, Transvaal 
and Natal, in terms of membership, racial composftion and political traditon. This 
paper and the larger work from which it is taken , however, argue inter alia that 
the conflict stemmed to a greater degree from a more fundamental problem, namely 
differing interpretations of liberalism and thus of the role of South African 
liberals held by various elements within the Liberal Party (LP). This paper 
analyses the political creed of those parliamentary and other liberals who became 
the early leaders of the LP. Their standpoint developed in specific circumstances 
during the period 1947-1950, and reflected opposition to increasingly radical black 
political opinion and activity, and retreat before the unfolding of apartheid after 
1948. This particular brand of liberalism was marked by a rejection of extra- 
parliamentary activity, by a complete rejection of the univensal franchise, and by 
anti-communism - the negative cgaracteristics of the early LP, but also the areas of 
most conflict within the party. 
The liberals under study - including the Ballingers, Donald Molteno, Leo 
Marquard, and others - were all prominent figures. All became early leaders of the 
Liberal Party in 1953, but had to be *Ihijackedff igto the LP by having their names 
published in advance of the party being launched. The strategic prejudices of a 
small group of parliamentarians, developed in the 1940s, were thus to a large degree 
grafted on to non-racial opposition politics in the 1950s through an alliance with a 
younger generation of anti-Nationalists in the LP. The young LP members, while 
conservative in many respects, did not share the hostility and fear of extra- 
parliamentary methods of opposition held by the leaders of their party,'and revealed 
a far greater degree of flexibility over both policy and strategy. The net result 
of this alliance was to retard the emergence of a party unfettered by major 
ideological and/or strategic dislocations. Such internal unity was speedily 
achieved following the 1959 launch of the Progressive Party on a platform virtually 
indistinguishable from that of the LP in 1953, and the rapid efflux of members from 
the LP into the Progressive Party. 
This paper analyses a series of liberal political Programmes which were 
published during 1948 and 1949, and the actions of the Nativesf Representatives, the 
Institute of Race Relations (IRR), and others, which accompanied these Programmes. 
The paper also briefly looks at the effects on this activity of Hymie Basnerfs 
attempt tb relaunch the Socialist Party. Taken together, the Programmes and 
associated activity to a large degree constituted the ideological and strategic 
content of that brand of liberalism espoused by the LP in the early 1950s. This 
type of ffextremeft liberalism was in the 1940s most clearly associated with the 
leading Natives* Representatives, who represented the crunch point of white 
liberalism, i.e. the point at whcih it was in most direct contact with organised 
black politioal opinion. In this paper I am concerned not to describe or define ' 
South African liberalism en bloc but to deconstruct the ideology and strategic 
decisions which informed that strand of liberalism associated with the liberal 
organisations of the early 1950s (the Civil Right League (CRL), the various liberal 
gr6ups which formed the Liberal Association, and the early LP). This paper also 
briefly examines the role of Illiberal economicsff as adumbrated by writers in 
Forwn and elsewhere, particularly following the publication of the Fagan Report. 
After 1949 none of the early leaders of the LP expressed their political creed in 
economic terms, and economic liberalism did not play a major role in Liberal 
politics during the 1950s. At the same time, neither Iteconomic liberalismt1 nor 
newly formed pressure groups such as the CRL succeeded in reorienting the United 
Party (UP) away from a slide into reaction. By 1950, appeals for public support 
from the CRL, the Liberal Association, and later the LP, were made not in economic 
or overtly political language but rather in broad, moral terms. While the authors 
of the 1948/49 liberal Programmes retreated behind increasingly general terminology, 
however, the constituent elements of the brand of liberalism associated with the 
early LP were in place. An understanding of liberal activity and the different 
interpretations of liberalism that existed in the perid under study explains 
something of the internal conflict which racked the LP in the 1950s; it also goes 
some way to explaining the different directions followed by the very different 
elements contained within,the LP in the 1950s and early 1960s. . 
Liberalism, 1947-1950 
In the 1940s (and subsequently) liberalism was used largely as a descriptive term 
covering the IRR and Natives1 Representatives, welfare organisations, the hierarchy 
and certain prominent members of some English churches, and others who called for a 
spirit of inter-racial goodwill, governmental tolerance, and a relaxation of state 
interference in the affairs of black individuals. As Julius Lewin, lecturer and 
influential writer commented, 
That I was a socialist always seemed to people 
irrelevant . . . People knew, or thought they knew, what 
a liberal is and what a communist believed and stood 
for. They knew that I was not a communist and that I 
worked with liberals, so they inferred I must be a 
liberal. 20 I was in the terms of South African 
tradition. 
At a general level, liberalism in South Africa (as elsewhere) in the 1940s was a 
political discourse centred on the war-time Four Freedoms and the freedoms contained 
in the Atlantic Charter. During the war, welfare-statism was partially endorsed by 
Hofmeyr and the progressive wing of t e UP, and more wholeheartedly by the IRR, the t: Nativest Representatives, and others. The war years saw the high point of this 
form of liberalism, as it became a discourse adopted by a wide range of 
organisations and individuals, from Hofmeyr to the Community Party (CP). It 
intersected with a similar international discourse, but the reassurance drawn from 
this fact by the liberals under study became increasingly sparse as post-war 
international opinion swung against South Africa's racial policies. At the same 
time, this general form of liberalism ceased to represent a domestic political 
consensus. 
Using the same general definition, liberalism can be said to represent the 
dominant political discourse within the African National Congress (ANC), at least 
until the late 1940s. This was reflected in the demands of African Claims and the 
influence of the Atlantg Charter, as well as in the attention paid by the ANC to 
the UN and its Charter. The rise of the Youth League, while moving the ANC into 
extra-parliamentary activity such as the passive resistance of 1952, represented a 
more militant call for democracy rather than a radical change in nature. 
Liberalism, as propounded by the Natives' Representatives, the IRR and others, 
remained, however, a parliamentary creed, and disavowed the use of extra- 
parliamentary methods of opposition. The seeming convergence of political outlook 
of the war years, between white liberals and the ANC, was by 1952 visibly untenable. 
The ANC developed an increasingly democratic programme, starting with the demand for 
universal suffrage in African Claims in 1943. The liberals under study in this 
paper - while representing the extreme wing of a general, parliamentary creed in 
calling for the gradual assimilation of all blacks - rejected the ANC 
franchise demand and feared the llrevolutionarytl potential of extra-parliamentary 
opposition. While this form of liberalism continued to be developed by a process of 
interaction with black politics, the interaction during the late 1940s was based as 
much on wary suspicion as on a free exchange of ideas. 
Within the large number of white individuals and organisations termed 
ttliberall* by the generalised term described above, there existed fundamental 
disagreements over both ultimate goals and strategy. During the Second World War, 
the liberals under scrutiny in this paper, together with the IRR and sections of the 
UP, supported a general administrative programme which called for the gradual 
bettering of black living conditions, and successfully injected the rhetoric of 
welfare provision by the state to talfe the place (at least in part) of the cost of 
labour reproduction by the Reserves. Stress was laid on the need for the 
parliamentary achievement of such black socio-economic advancement. This 
represented the mainstream of white liberal thought and was championed by Hofmeyr 
until his death in 1948. Where their views coincided, Hofmeyr led the "progres~ive~~ 
wing of the UP that opposed migrant labour and called for a stable, permanent, 
urban, black labour force. The 1948 UP electoral defeat was blamed by almost all 
sections of the party (including the psogressives) on Hofmeyr's ltliberalismlf - as 
described by Nationalist propagandists - and it took Smutsts personal interve~tion 
to end the witch-hunt launched against Hofmeyr's position as UP deputy leader. 
Despite the best work of Alan Paton's biographical study, Hofmeyr's repeated refusal 
to break from the UP, and his failure to translate the Christian, assimilationist 
sentiments of his speeches into political action, leave his statusl~s a liberal - 
rather than a cultured or well educated individual - questionable. 
The post-war failure of liberals outside the UP to influence Hofmeyr 
either to lead a new political party or to grant welfarist concessions, particularly 
during the NRC crisis (when Hofmeyr was Acting Prime Minister in the absence of 
Smuts), led to the development of a new strand of liberal thinking. The NRC crisis 
revealed the lack of influence the liberals under study could wield over Hofmeyr and 
the UP, and over the ANC in its adoption of the electoral boycott in late 1946. As 
a result, Leo Marquard, Margaret Ballinger and her supporters, followed cautiously 
by Edgar Brookes and elements within the IRR, accepted the need for the development 
of a political programme - albeit alongside the existing stress on administrative 
betterment. The point of difference between them and the UP progressives lay with 
the franchise. As mentioned above, by 1943 the universal franchise was the prime 
demand of the ANC, endorsed by "radicalt' and llmoderatelf alike. Hofmeyr and his 
supporters, such as John Cope, editor of The Forum, spoke of liberalism as an 
ideology which accepted "certain fundamental inequalities between Europeans and 
African~~~~Put which held that "Africans are (nevertheless) entitled to some place in 
the sunw. Margaret Ballinger, Marquard and others argued that, alongside 
socio-economic advancement, blacks had to be assimilated to the values of "western 
civilisationI1. Such assimilation, they argued, should be rewarded with full 
citizenship rights. It was because of this standpoint on the franchise that the 
Natives1 Representatives and others described themselves as liberals and'the true 
inheritors of the #*Cape liberal traditiontf. While regarding Hofmeyr and others as 
overly cautious, these "extreme1* liberals nonf2the less looked to Hofmeyr to lead 
the new political party frequently hinted at. 
Liberalism as espoused by the Natives1 Representatives was that with which 
Congress members came in most direct contact. Despite the break with the 
administrative agenda of the war years, the liberals under study remained at odds 
with the Congresses over the franchise. The Representatives had also been, and 
continued to be, actively involved in attempting to break the "native 
representationf1 boycott adopted by the ANC (see below). Through such actions, even 
this strand of liberal activity, seen by the UP progressives as r9extremet1, gained 
specific riegative associations of timidity and obstructionism in the eyes of the 
Congresses. 
A further strand of liberal thinking became clear after 1948, developed by 
Leo Marquard, Julius Lewin and others, particularly through their writing in 
Forum. It was influenced by the work of Hymie Basner in the mid-1940s. These men 
defined liberalism as primarily concerned not with Christian moralism but economic ' 
development. Marquard argued that, if the humanitarian impulses of the larger 
grouping of white liberals in the churches, welfare organisations and elsewhere were 
to have any political force, they had to be allied to an economic interest - 
preferably alongside the lfprogressivelf wing of the UP. Basner and Lewin both 
campaigned for a non-racial alliance between "secondary industrytf and the "working 
class" as a means of throwing off the yoke of the cheap labour system. Both called 
for a Illiberal party" to achieve this new alliance. 
None of these different strands of political thought, all of which 
influenced liberalism as it was defined in the 1950s, was exclusive. The ideas of 
the different groups and individuals under study - all of whom were white, middle 13 
class and well educated, and who operated in the same social and political spheres 
- percolated through into the programmes and arguments of others. In 1948, 
proponents of the different strands of liberal thinking saw in certain conclusions 
of the Fagan Report the possibility of entrenching liberals - if not liberalism - in 
the mainstream of political life. This would be achieved by an alliance with that 
wing of the UP which supported the creation of a stable, urban black labour force. 
The Representatives (excluding Basner) united in an attempt to arrest the growth of 
support for what were seen as dangerously radical extra-parliamentary tactics. All 
united, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, in an attempt to exclude the CP from 
exerting influence over organised black political opinion. This was seen to be 
urgently necessary as the more moderate elements within the ANC leadership, to whom 
the Natives9 Representatives and others had been accustomed to look for support, 
were coming under increased pressure from the CP and Youth League. At the same 
time, the period under study saw the Congresses and the African Peoples' 
Organisation (APO) displaying an increasing ideological and strategic unity, which 
found expression in such events as the People's Assembly for Votes For All in 1948 
and the Defend Free Speech Convention in 1950. 
The Political Context 
The following, brief, historical sketch outlines the political environment following 
the NRC collapse of 1946, within which liberals were working. In 1947 Leo Marquard 
complained 18at Illiberalism is on the defensive", its forces lfconsiderable if 
disunitedM. The NRC crisis had questioned the legitimacy of the 1936 system of 
"native representation" under which the Representatives held their seats, and had 
closed the NRC as a channel of communication with and possible influence over black 
leaders. It had also left the Natives' Representatives isolated from Hofmeyr and 
others in the UP to whom they had previously looked for support. The IRR at the 
same time noted that Joint Council membership was declining in favour of black 
political organisations; this, the IRR concluded, was due to the Joint Councils' 
"inabiI&ty to effect those fundamental changes which Africans have demanded (for) so 
long" . 
Following the NRC crisis, which came hard on the heels of Indian 
mobilisation over the Asiatic Land Tenure Act, the need for a united front against 
segregation became a recurrent theme of Congress and CP propaganda. In January 1947 
the CP Annual Conference called for thf6formation of a "broad fighting alliance1* 
campaigning for a universal franchise. At a "unity rally" in May 1947, Xuma 
commented on the "historic" nature of the rally, held as f;4 was under the auspices 
of the ANC, Transvaal Indian Congress (TIC), and the APO. In August 1947 a joint 
committee of the ANC, TIC and APO began organising a national convention to campaign 
for full democracy, andl&hereby to provide a "note of sanity" on the eve of the 
white general election. The emerging black organisational alliance, behind the 
call for full and equal rights for all races, rallied none of the parliamentary 
liberals to its cause. The growing convergence of Congress and CP tactics after 
1945 found expression in the 1946/47 electoral boycott and the endorsement by 
leading NRC and ANC members of extra-parliamentary methods of opposition, both of 
which were vigorously opposed by the liberals under study. As a result, they saw 
themselves in competition with the CP for black political allegiance. Anti- 
communist sentiments were fuelled by the growing Cold War and by threats of 
anti-communist legislation. It was in opposition to the emerging alliance that 
liberals in various quarters attempted to forge an alternative coalition of forces. 
For liberals, the fruits of the alliance were the adoption of extra- 
parliamentary methods of opposition, particularly the electoral boycott. During 
1946, Margaret Ballinger and Edgar Brookes moved from hectoring to threats and 
private lobbying in an attempt to defeat the boycott.19 With the death in April 
1947 of G K Hemming, Natives1 Representative for the Transkei, the conflict between 
the parliamentary liberals and the boycotters was brought into sharp focus. William 
Ballinger announced his intention to contest the seat. With Margaret Ballinger and 
Hymie Basner, he attended the emergency conference of 3p Transvaal ANC in June 
1947, called to discuss implementation of the boycott. Supported by conservative 
NRC member Paul Mosaka and others, the Representatives attempted to force the 
conference to reject the boycott, and to call a national conference to do the same. 
Hymie Basner described the boycott as a l*sillyw idea and warned conference that 
"before spu carry it out you will have the fight of your lives from me and from 
others1*. 
The strength of the boycott movement in the Transkei, organised by Govan 
Mbeki and sustained by the Transkei Organised Bodies and the Transkei Af~hcan 
Voters* Association, was sufficient to persuade Ballinger to stand down. He none 
the less joined Donald Molteno in supporting the candidacy of Douglas Buchanan. On 
an electors4 tour of the constituency, voters' meetings refused Molteno and Buchanan 
a hearing. The Voters Association repeated the boycott call, warning against 
"white careeristsw and their "black Judasesl1; if electsj, the Association stated, 
"they will be representing nobody but their appetitesft. The opposition to 
Buchanan could not be tested, because the seat was not contested; its strength can, 
however, be gauged from the fact that he felt obliged to write to voters promising 
that, if they replied in sufficient 9ybers asking him not to continue as their 
Representative, he would stand down. 
By January 1948 the boycott, never a popular 5grategy with the Ivold guard1I 
ANC leadership, was openly rejected by Xuma and others. Sustaining a full 
electoral boycott became impossible in the confused situation, and the ANC and CP 
decided to support the election2qf llboycott candidates" who would call for the 
repeal of the 1936 legislation. The arguments used by their candidates to explain 
the switch, particularly the claim that insufficient organisation had taken place to 
carry through a boycott and that the new NRC candidates would use their positions to 
underj&e such organisation, were the same that Margaret Ballinger had used in 
1946. By the time the change came about, however, the parliamentary liberals had 
been seen to be actively attempting to sabotage the boycott. The well publicised 
activities of William Ballinger, Molteno and Buchanan in the Transkei, moreover, 
served to compound growing black hostility to what was seen as an obstructionist 
position. 
Alliance Politics 
Despite their inability to influence the UP, it remained the central focus for the 
political hopes of the liberals under study. For socialists such as Hymie Basner, 
however, the Labour Party's continued support for measures which entrenched black 
exploitation but protected the interests of the white working class was of more 
immediate concern. While Margaret Ballinger and others continued to make appeals 
for a lib a1 party in the most general terms of "(a) policy of widening rights for 86 Africans1* , Basner sought to create a vehicle which would champion a new alliance 
between the (non-racial) "working class" and certain forms of secondary industry, 
and thereby end the cheap labour system. Basner's significance for the work in hand 
were the direct appeals he made to his electorate as the basis for a new alliance 
which would include ANC members but would exclude radical and/or CP members of 
Congress. Basner maintained a loyalty to the CP (which he had left during the war) 
as "the best expression of the asp&ations of the working class - irrespective of 
race - now existing in the Union". He argued, however, that the CP was incapable 
of achieving the democratic reforms which h3f to be won "before the fight for 
socialism becomes anything like a reality". 
In early 1947 Basner attempted to capitaAhse on the wave of black support 
engendered by his appearance at the United Nations by calling for a non-racial 
National Convention; whgr~ this appeal failed, he attempted to resuscitate the 
defunct Socialist Party. Basner hoped to create an alliance between the "African 
chiefs, the wealthy Indian merchants, (and) the clergymen of all denominations~~; 
they would be joined by "the progressive white industrialists (and) trade union 
leaders steeped in reform ism^.^^ Such a bourgeois coalition, he felt, could be 
persuaded to unite with the working class on a "minimum programme of necessary 
changes" which would include abolition of the pass l a ~ 3 ~  franchise extension, and 
repeal of the industrial colour bar and the Land Acts. Basner claimed that, by 
adumbrating a message in economic terms that whites could understand, rather than 
moral or egalitarian terms they would reject, a new alliance could be created. It 
is significant that Basnerts minimum programme constituted the ultimate goal at 
which his fellow Nativesr Representatives aimed. More significant for its effects 
on future liberal activity was Basnerls appeal to his black electorate, not simply 
for loyalty in the face of the boycott but as the means of forging an alternative 
alliance to that emerging between the Congresses, the APO and the CP. The need to 
create a power-base came to be recognised by many liberals in the post-war 
situation, and Leo Marquard joined Basner in defining liberals in purely economic 
terms. Marquard argued that liberals were simply those "who see in the development 
of secondary industries the prospect of a more sane outlook on African wages and 
social conditionsw, who demanded increased social servi and who saw hope for the 
future in "the progressive development of the African".'gs'To avoid division, 
Marquard sidestepped political questions regarding the franchise, residential and 
social segregation, by claiming that libera137"take full account of social forces 
and do not desire to force the social pace". 
The unstructured nature of such attempts to create a liberal consensus 
changed, following the 1948 general election, when liberals in various quarters 
sought to redirect black political oghnion behind a llpracticallf and less radical 
programme than they were discussing. In July 1948 Margaret and William Ballinger 
subm ted a "Programme for Progress", based on aspects of the Fagan.Report, to the h& ANC. Margaret Ballinger described her main role following4&he 1948 general 
election as "helping Africans to build up their own policy1f. Privately, she 
stated that Africans had to dou;some fresh thinking ... instead of drifting on a sea 
of old thoughts and emotionstt. The Fagan report, broadly speaking, attempted to 
satisfy different sectors of the economy with different labour demands, and thus 
maintain both migratory labour and a degree of black urbanization. In so doing, the 
Report attempted also to unify different wings of the UP. Liberals, both in and out 
of parliament, set great store by the Report following the commitment to it given by 
Smuts while still in office, whi~9, according to the IRR, gave it a significance 
that "cannot be over-estimated". The IRR and other liberals, while criticising 
the Report, highlighted the positive passages which spoke of t& inevitability of 
economic integration and the permanence of black urbanization. 
The Ballingers, influenced by Basner, went one step further and attempted 
to generate black support for the Fagan report. They argued that the ANC should 
base its policy on the Reart, "taking out what they would have and making clear 
what they would not have" , in much the same way as the Ballingers and others were 
doing. The Ballingers were faced with the emergence of an increasingly radical 
black alliance which they experienced first-hand through the election boycott; 
moreover, tfbty were denied any parliamentary influence by the Nationalist 
government. The Ballingers envisaged a moderate black power bloc which would use 
the positive aspects of the Fagan Report to create a rapprochement with UP 
progressives. ughe point of contact between the two sides in such an alliance would 
be the liberals : more specifically, the Nativesv Representatives. The Ballingers 
attempted to facilitate the creationofan alliance by concentrating on 
administrative issues and avoiding confrontation over divisive political demands. 
While the Ballinger Programme dealt specifically with certain contentious prop@als, 
it stressed the acceptability of the "general principles" of the Fagan Report. 
The two general principles most ardently supported by the Ballingers were 
economic integration and the acceptance of a permanent black urban presence. At the 
same time4&hey spoke hazily of the need "to level-up wage rates between one area and 
another". Until this levelling-up was achieved, however, the Ballingers proposed 
modification of the Land Acts and a capital injection for the Reserves; rural 
migrants, they noted, posed Ifspecial problemsw: 
Let us have locations for the new and untrained people 
but for all the others there should be freedom to live 
as Europeans do (altho* we shall probably have to 
accept separate areas ) . 
The Ballingers, in carefully seductive language, attempted to translate the need 
for a permanent, semi-skilled black labour force into the vision of a fully 
integrated bourgeoisie, to which influx control and social (if not residential) 
segregation need not apply. 
The assumption that the urbanised African who adopted "western 
civilisationt1 would be rewarded with full citizenship rights was, as shown above, by 
no means shared by even the uprogressive~t wing of the UP. The Ballingers none the 
less saw the Vrogramme for Progressw as "a practical programme designed to 
strengthen th African population to the point at which it may successfully make its 
own demandstl.'O The Programme hinged on the coming into being of a black middle 
class, seen as an 8tinevitable1f product of economic integration and urbanisation. 
They submitted the Programme to precisely those members of the ANC leadership who 
had worked closely with them in the past, and who were coming under incresing 
pressure from the Youth League. These included A B Xuma, who opposed the electoral 
boycott, and secretary-general James Calata. The Ballingers sub~ftted the Programme 
in time for adoption at the mid-1948 ANC Bloemfontein Conference , where it was 
ignored. Margaret Ballinger, facing both Nationalist opposition and the election 
boycott in her Cape Eastern seat, concluded that "there are apparent13 no African 
organisations active enough to take the stand they should be taking". 2 
Adjustment and Influence 
The Ballingers were alone in attempting to carve out a direct liberal role in black 
politics. In January 1948, Donald Molteno, Natives* Representative for Cape 
Western, presented a lIDemoc$!!tic Programmett at a public lecture as a future guide 
for white liberal activity. The most significant aspect of Moltenoqs Programme 
was his description of the future role of the white liberal, which informed the 
subsequent proposals of the IRR and others. Molteno stated that 
The main features of a democratic programme ... 
would be the elevation of practical achievements 
above doctrinaire considerations, the fostering of 
inter-racial goodwill and the avoidance of all 
rigidities in legislation and administration, thus 
leaving the door open to ajustment in accordance 
with changing conditions. 
A similar desire to maintain liberals in positions of influence while avoiding the 
party-political arena marked an IRR pamphlet which appeared in June k848, entitled 
Apartheid and Other Policies, written by IRR Director Quintyn Whyte. Whyte 
attempted to deflect the5&nternal pressure brought to bear on the IRR to declare 
itself a political party by claiming that liberals had a special role to play as 
those armed with the knowledge of Ismodern social thinking" which "has presented us 
with a number of generally accepted doctrinesw. Among these he cited agreement that 
"the racist doctrine of the Herrenvolk &q abhorrent and that man must not exploit 
man or one group of interests another". He argued that, as predicted by the Fagan 
Report, economic integration would continue unabated, and 
there must be constant adjustments and it will fall to 
the lot of the liberal mind to try to ensure that 
those adjustments are made with the minimum friction. 
This will not be an enviable task; it will please 
neither the radical nor the reacti~ary: but it is an 
essential function in our society. 
The Programmes of the Ballingers, Molteno and the IRR shared a common fear 
of exclusion from the political process by the proponents of extremism, from both 
left and right. At the same time, however, the Fagan Report seemed to offer an 
objective economic promise of black political assimilation, described by Julius 
Lewin as "their belief that the requirements  economic progress would somehow 
magically lead to a change in race relations". Liberals soon began arguing, Leo 
Marquard noted, "that 'economic forces1 will so alter the situation that even a 
reactionary p~liament will be compelled to abandon the attempt at reactionary 
legislation". In contradistinction to the Ballinger initiative, Molteno and Whyte 
argued that liberals ought to entrench themselves in the political machinery where, 
through an objective acceptance of economic facts which were unpalatable to white 
voters, they would advise on the points of ftadjustmentw caused by economic 
development. 
Economic Liberalism 
The last programmatic attempt to define liberalism explicitly in terms of the Fagan 
Report was made by The Forum in a series of editorials and articles published in 
mid-1949. The Forum based its argument on the proposition that the industrial 
colour bar 
deprives Non-Europeans of the opportunity of doing 
skilled work, and deprives the country of a vast 
reservoir of latent talent and ability which is being 
frittered away ... The basis of (our) approach is 
economic integration ... The country's economic 
salvation depends on a better use of our manpower and 
a steadily rising ~tandard of living for the mass of 
the Native people. 
The Forum continued by stating that "in South Africa the industrialist stands to 
gain from almost everything advocated by the liberal school of thoughtw, since both 
shared a vision of the bla@ population as the single greatest potential source of 
labour and consumer goods. 
The Forum accordingly defined liberals as those who opposed migratory 
labour and favoured a stable urban labour force, and who opposed unnecessary 
bureaucratic control over the work-force, not least because of the cost involved in 
the administration of influx control. Finally, The Forum cited the desire of both 
liberals and industrialists for "labour ~ontentment~~, 9 9  warned against the 
inflammatory effects of both ~*communism** and apartheid. The only political 
suggestion offered by the series of articles was to call for the reintroduction of 
the old Cape franchise. The Forum linked its liberal articles to Margaret 
Ballin r's 1949 announcement that she was considering launching a new political e;% 
party. Both Ballinger and The Forum defined their liberalism in the economic 
terms above, while rejecting the universal franchise and ignoring other political 
issues, and both defined liberalism in explicitly anti-communist terms. The 
involvement of leading CP members such as J B Marks with issues such as the Western 
Areas t r g  boycott, which began in September 1949 and was attended by sporadic 
violence , served merely to compound the liberal view that communists were making 
political capital out of black living conditions. Both Ballinger and The orum 
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called for the creation of a middle class as a bulwark against communism. 
The Ballinger/Form initiative seemed to combine the very different 
directions followed by liberal strategists in this period. It brought together, on 
the basis of the Fagan Report, the ideas of those who sought influence over societal 
adjustment, and those who sought power by alliance with the UP. It also looked to 
undercut the CP and offered Margaret Ballinger as a replacement for Hofmeyr as a 
national figurehead. As with all the liberal initiatives of this period, the 
Ballinger/Forum plan attempted to use the different labour requirements of the 
burgeoning industrial sector as a stepping-stone to ultimate black political 
participation. According to this view, representation for llcivilisedln blacks was a 
necessary concomitant of economic progress. The qualified franchise was taken as 
granted in those liberal initiatives which dealt with political, rather than 
administrative, issues. The Ballinger/Forum proposals mentioned black 
representation only in passing, and fell away precisely because of the black 
hostility they attracted. 
The left-wing newspaper The Guardian had maintained a largely positive 
attitude towards the Natives1 Representatives in the post-war period, but was by 
1949 openly hostile to llliberalsfl and made no distinction (where it had previoug;)y 
done so) between the liberalism of the Representatives and that of Jan Hofmeyr. 
Black reaction to the 1949 Ballinger/Forum proposals also reflected the tendency to 
characterise the different creeds mentioned above as one, and showed growing 
hostility towards such wliberalsll en masse. A letter from leading NIC member Ahmed 
llKathyll Kathrada defined liberals simply in terms of their refusal to support the 
strategies and campaigns of the Congresses after 1945. Accusing "the men and women 
of the liberal creed" of cowardice, Kathrada stated: 
Our experiences have been that these individuals, who 
are usually vociferous in their claims for justice and 
fairplay for the black man, have on every occasion 68 
when their assistance was required, sadly failed us. 
At a meeting of the left-wing Durban organization, the Council for Human Rights, a 
black speaker described the methods of liberalism as I1humble peti&&ons and 
respectable deputations1I which had failed to "deliver the goods1I. At the same 
meeting Jordan Ngubane, editor of Inkundla ya Bantu and later a prominent member of 
the Liberal Party, stressed that the failure of white liberals to intervene 
significantly in black po3i)tical life was assisting the growth of lvrevolutionary" 
philosophies and methods. A year later he noted that Itthe collapse of African 
Moderation has been largely occasioned by the failure of the European Liberals as7? 
group to take an unequivocal and unfaltering stand on the vital colour question". 
Conclusion 
As the Nationalist Party entrenched itself in power after 1948, and African 
nationalism expressed itself in mass civil disobedience in 1952, the liberals under 
study found themselves continuing to attract considerable national publicity but 
unable to exert influence over either of the two dominant political discourses. The 
complete failure of the 1948/9 initiatives to create a centrist coalition meant that 
liberal activity focussed on the UP for the next five years. When the Liberal Party 
was finally launched in 1953, arguably the main strand of South African liberalism 
remained within the UP and broke away only in 1959. The LP was at base an umbrella 
organisation, drawing together conservatives, s'ocialists and ex-communists alike. 
The initially dominant group within the LP were the liberals under study, and their 
conservatism - the response to their failure to influence African nationalism or to 
rally industrial or political support for their programmes - led directly to the 
internal conflict which dogged the LP until the end of the 1950s. At the same time, 
however, the constituent elements of the form of liberalism discussed above - 
notably political caution over the franchise, anti-communism, and an emphasis on 
parliamentary methods of achieving change, combined with mistrust of other forms of 
activity - were the core elements of LP appeal in the 1950s. 
The twin elements of non-racialism (still debated in the Liberal 
Association in 1952) and anti-communism served to sustain the appeal of the LP after 
its policies on issues from the franchise to land and wealth redistribution were 
virtually indistinguishable from those in the Freedom Charter. Moreover, an 
understanding of the core elements of the form of liberalism associated with the LP 
goes some way to explaining why the LP was able to hold together groups of 
substantially different political outlook. It also suggests a means of 
understanding the internal contradictions of the LP - its successful black 
recruitment, not in urban, industrial areas but in the rural areas of northern Natal 
and northern Transvaal, and the association of some of its members with the sabotage 
group the African Resistance Movement. This paper has suggested that these core 
elements were not &imply responses to the nature or membership of the Congress 
Alliance, but had a much longer history. A n  understanding of the period 1947-50 
goes some way to revealing the complex nature of liberalism and the influences it 
drew on, as well as providing a framework for an understanding of liberalism in the 
1950s and 19608. 
This paper is taken from an early chapter of my thesis, being written up at the 
moment, entitled White Opposition to Apartheid, 1945-1960. The thesis 
concentrates on the organisations of the 1950s, the Liberal Party and Congress of 
Democrats, and traces their origins (organisational and ideological) in the 
1940s. 
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